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THE MILITARY'S CHANGING ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY:
WHAT DOES RIGHT LOOK LIKE?
In times of peace and prosperity cities and individuals alike follow higher standards because they are not forced into a situation where they have to do what they do not want to do. But war is a stern teacher, in depriving them of the power of easily satisfying their daily wants, it brings most people's minds down to the level of their actual circumstances.
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This quote by Thucydides from the time of the Peloponnesian Wars still holds true today, and more importantly, addresses not only prosecuting the nation's wars but has utility in contending with natural disasters and domestic emergencies as well. As the nation deals with the recent aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma that ravaged the United States Gulf
Coast Region, leaders at all levels of government are conducting after action reviews of existing emergency action plans and are discovering the plans to be either circumspect or woefully outdated, leaving the public in want of the most basic of needs: food, clothing, and shelter.
Certain leaders have waved accusatory fingers at other levels of government in an attempt to deflect criticism of their own failed leadership. Still others believe that the federal government, and most specifically the military, is in the best position and is the best equipped to handle America's disasters and emergencies.
This groundswell of support for the military to be the nation's '911 force' or national first responders has grown to the point the issue has reached the doorstep of the White House.
President Bush, following Hurricane Katrina, called for a "greater federal role in large-scale disaster response efforts, and greater use of military forces in particular." 2 In the wake of this directive, the Department of Defense has already taken steps to designate permanent Defense
Coordinating Officers (DCOs) at state-level and is currently mulling over the creation of new military police units and designation of a dedicated military unit which will respond to similar catastrophic events in the future. 3 Other leaders in the United States Congress are discussing altering the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 to give the military greater power in a law enforcement role in domestic operations. 4 Inasmuch as this may be seen as being done for the greater good, I am not one who believes the military should take on an increased role in homeland security operations. As a self-proclaimed pragmatist, I believe the military instrument of national power is sanctioned to fight and win the nation's wars-in a true Clausewitzian sense-and should also respond to national security and public security issues (e.g., those threats which affect the larger society and entail the joint use of military and civilian law enforcement), as required. Somehow though, in the aftermath of these destructive hurricanes, the line of demarcation between public security and citizen security has become blurred and leaders across the nation are climbing onto the proverbial bandwagon to task the military with greater roles, missions, and responsibilities, even in this time of the present Global War on Terrorism. This blurring has a resultant shift toward citizen security which I believe to be of detriment to the military as a whole, especially as the increased role overextends the military with the assignment of additional missions at the lower end of the range of military operations.
As an integral part of this discussion, and given the recent domestic events and the current global war on terrorism, the current national debate begs the question: Will the United Reserve.
14 Subtitle E provides the purpose for the Reserve Components:
The purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.
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Furthermore, the basic policy for ordering the reserve components into Federal service is delineated in the same subtitle:
Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such parts of them as are needed, together with units of other reserve components necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active duty and retained as long as so needed. 16 Additionally, Title 14 of the U.S. difference between homeland security and homeland defense is subtle; however, the clarifier for the latter-Department of Defense-is the key, and this will become clearer as the discussion progresses.
The overarching national strategies that I refer to in this portion are the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. I will also analyze the National Response Plan.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, establishes homeland security as the Nation's top priority. As such, the strategy first addresses the use of force (and the probable use of the armed forces) against terrorist acts by defending the homeland in concert with the preemptive strike doctrine. 41 The Bush administration then addresses the need to use military forces in a potentially innovative manner, 42 47 The strategy does not establish a set of priorities or chain-of-command nor does the strategy seek to clarify how the military assistance is supposed to work.
The National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, is the first document of its kind in this country, and it focuses on securing the homeland from terrorist attacks. The Executive Summary addresses the need for a collective, ". . . coordinated and focused effort from our entire society." 48 The President readily recognizes the fact that the U.S. government is based on federalism, which is a system with shared responsibilities and power between the state governments and federal institutions, which, in his wordsprovides unique opportunity challenges for our homeland security efforts. The opportunity comes from the expertise and commitment of local agencies and organizations involved in homeland security. The challenge is to develop interconnected and complementary systems that are reinforcing rather than duplicative and that ensure essential requirements are met. Office (JFO). 54 As I elaborated on earlier, the U.S. Army has already taken steps to not simply appoint these officers but assign them to respective states in an effort to make them permanent and ensure continuity. The Oklahoma City bombing occurred on April 19, 1995 and was the largest act of domestic violence in our nation's history prior to 9/11. The calm of that spring morning was shattered at 9:02 a.m. when a truck filled with a 4,800 pound ammonium nitrate fuel bomb exploded near the north entrance to the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 55 The Final Report is a detailed account of the heroism and professionalism exhibited by all of the first responders, urban search and rescue teams, military units, volunteers, and local, state, and federal government officials and employees. Overall, the military's role in responding to this emergency was relatively minimal, with a total of 731 Oklahoma National Guard Soldiers and 591 personnel from Tinker Air Force Base (AFB) participating in the operation. 56 Tinker AFB made every resource available to the operation and National Guard units assisted logistically by also providing boots, uniforms, entrenching tools, and other equipment. 57 Other National Guard Soldiers assisted members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) at a local weapon firing range with sifting through debris. National Guard Chaplains provided counseling support to law enforcement officials. 58 Emergency medical service ambulances from nearby Tinker AFB, under a mutual aid agreement with the city, arrived soon after the blast and provided "load and go" services to evacuate the wounded to nearby hospitals. 59 United States Army Corps of Engineers personnel provided civil engineering expertise at the scene of the blast, continuously monitoring the columns and beams of the Murrah Building. 60 The first National Guard Soldiers arrived at 6:00 p.m. on April 19 and established perimeter security around the nine-square-block incident area. The next day on April 20, the National Guard and Tinker Air Force Base units were tasked to establish a tight security cordon around the Family Assistance Center in order to protect the privacy of the families. 61 Perimeter security requirements changed slightly and were slowly phased out over the twenty days the National Guard was in place, with the last National Guard and Tinker AFB units being released May 8, 1995. Prior to these recent events, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization, was asked to provide recommendations on how to effectively and efficiently manage the emergency management system through the three levels of government and the private sector regarding ". . . the relationship between preparedness for national security emergencies and domestic civil emergency preparedness and response." 64 The panel provided the following summary in its 1993 report, Coping with Catastrophe:
[The Department of Defense (DoD)], the state guard units, and the governors must devote more attention to the need for a more extensive role for state guards in emergency management, particularly disaster response. Until some new balance is struck between missions and capabilities keyed to DoD's Total Force Structure and the emergency management needs of the states, the emergency management capabilities of the states will be deficient. The pressure to call for federal troops in the event of disasters or civil disorder will continue, or even grow. 65 The National Academy for Public Administration was asked again in 1997 to provide an independent assessment of the National Guard's role in emergency management. came to the same conclusion: "The National Guard has arrived at a critical juncture. It has a chance to redefine its relationships with other components and reaffirm or redefine its state and national defense missions and roles." 74 These agreements would provide the necessary resources between states and throughout a given region as originally designed. Second, National Guard personnel could enlist and stay in a state and serve for twenty-plus years if desired. This would be a potential boon to the local economy, and families would be more receptive to their sons and daughters joining in this capacity knowing they would not be deployed, thus having a positive impact on the military's allvolunteer force. Experience and continuity would be increased ten-fold.
Conceivable disadvantages of restructuring the military would (1) require an increase to armed forces' end strength and a potential requirement to increase the military budget and (2) possibly worsen the existing schism between the active and reserve components. First, there are currently 150,000 Reserve Component Soldiers deployed on active duty fighting the Global War on Terrorism. 80 Restructuring the military to provide state governors with available assets and resources would be the necessary starting point, followed by identifying and moving the residual units (including existing Enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs)), personnel, and equipment to the active force and Reserves. Defining the active component and the Reserve roles and mission to meet the national defense strategy in the current geostrategic context would require a detailed study; however, panels and commissions from the past two decades have generated and published findings and recommendations, such as the 1997 NAPA study and several General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, which would prove invaluable to this process. The United States currently spends in excess of $100 billion annually on homeland security. 81 There would be a resultant shift from presidential declarations to state operations and maintenance (O & M) funding; however, this is an issue to be resolved by decision-makers promulgating the budget. Second, although the Army, for example, has worked diligently to sell the notion of "One Army," there still exists a notion of a factional rivalry between the military's three components. The "we versus they" contention has existed for decades; 82 restructuring the military to make the National Guard non-deployable might exacerbate the problem, and then again, it might not given the change in mission to fit the existing paradigm. Both would be immediate but would have a short-term effect. There is always a concomitant, up-front cost when incorporating change, and this instance would be no different.
Granted, the Department of Defense has already taken several prudent steps to utilize more efficiently the standing armed forces, e.g., assigning Defense Coordinating Officers however, the U.S. government must resolve the ambiguity that exists between the federal and state levels of government in order to meet the needs of the people of this nation.
In order to properly utilize the military instrument of national power, the United States government must grapple with the grammar and logic of the same and establish feasible, acceptable, and suitable missions for the military at the federal, state, and local levels of government regarding homeland security operations.
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